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Court Delay Caused by the Bar?
by Hans Zeisel

THERE IS AN understandable preoccupation in some of our courts
with efforts to share the responsibility
for their inordinate delay with somebody else. And so we hear occasionally that part, if not the whole, of the
blame must be put at the doorstep of
the trial bar. The negligence trial business, so the argument goes, is highly
concentrated in a few law firms, and
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Not so, says Professor Zeisel, who shows that delay for the individual
litigant in the trial of his suit has no connection with the general delay
in litigation in a given court. Statistically, he declares, the preferment
of some cases and the deferral of others does not create delay in the
court, as long as other cases are ready for trial. Accordingly, he concludes that courts should cease blaming court delay on lawyers with
too many cases.

since these firms have not enough lawyers to try their cases in time, delay
necessarily ensues.
Conceivably, the courts might make
it their business to see that litigants
do not suffer delay by bringing their
cases to firms in which most of the
trial business is concentrated. But before such steps are taken, it might be
useful to point out and to prove that
this delay for the individual litigant
has in principle no connection with,
and hence no influence on, the delay
o] the court.
To demonstrate this proposition, it
is necessary to recall that there is only
one meaningful way of measuring
court delay: the average time that
elapses between the point of time at
which a case is ready for trial and the
point at which it is actually tried.1
This interval will not be the same for
all cases, primarily because some cases
are accorded preferment by the court,
while others have to wait in regular
order.
It will help to see the problem of
individual delay versus court delay
more clearly if we look at a series of
three schematic graphs (page 387).
First, let us assume that all cases
are being tried in regular order, each
case in fact after a certain number of
time units (days or weeks, it does not
matter which) have elapsed. The cases
will then line up for trial as shown in
Table 1. Case A, having waited one
hundred time units is about to reach

American Bar Association Journal

HeinOnline -- 54 A.B.A. J. 886 1968

trial. If we further assume, to keep
the mathematics simple, that each case
requires one time unit for trial, Case B
will move up to trial after 99 + 1 =
100 time units, Case C after 98 + 2 100 time units, and so forth. Since all
cases are tried after a waiting time of
one hundred units, the average waiting
time is, of course, also one hundred.
Let us now assume that for cause the
court accords Cases H, I and J prefer.
ment and tries them ahead of Cases
A through G. We then obtain the
schedule shown in Table 2. The three
preferred cases have now had to wait
only ninety-two time units, but the
seven remaining cases had to wait 103
units (one extra unit for each preferred case). But since the time gained
by the three preferred cases (3 x 7 =
21) equals the time lost by the remaining seven (7 x 3 - 21), the average,
2
one hundred, remains unchanged.
We conclude that preferment of individual cases by the court has no effect on the over-all delay of the system.
1. To be sure, not all cases are ready when
they are filed, but for courts such as ours, in
which delay is of the order of five years, that
is a minor correction. There is, of course,
the problem at which point the count is to
begin. But for our purpose in this article it is
sufficient to see that only a time measurement
is the appropriate yardstick, not the quoting
of x-thousand cases that form the backlog,
even though the two are related. See ZEsL,
KALVEN

&

BUC-IsTOLZ,

DETAY

TN

TH-E CoRr,

especially Chapter 4 (1959).
2. One should not point out that preferment usually is given at an earlier stage,
rather than toward the end of the waiting
time, as in our graph. The mathematics remains the same regardless of the time preferment is accorded.

Court Delay Caused by the Bar?
We now consider the opposite situa.
tion-when cases, at the request of
the litigants or their counsel, are deferred and admitted to trial only at a
later date than that to which their original rank order would have entitled
them. We begin with Table 1 and shall
assume that Cases B, E and F are deferred at request of counsel and tried
after Cases A, C, D and G through J
have been tried. To complicate matters
ostensibly, let us assume further that
these three deferred cases are then tried
in reverse order, F, E, and B.
Again we see that the average time
of delay remains unaffected. We can
now state the general rule:
No shift in the waiting order, whether at the order oj the court or the request oj coun~sel, whether forward or
backward, can affect the delay of the
system provided the court keeps trying
eases.3
The phrase "provided the court
keeps trying cases" has implications
that need spelling out. It means that
the deferment must not cause a gap in
the trial schedule of the court: another case must be advanced in time to
take its place. It follows that requests
for deferment must be made in time.
however the court wants to define the
4
term.
At this point it is, theoretically, possible that the Bar could cause delay of
the system by having simply no lawyer
available to try any of the waiting
eases. But it is hardly necessary to
prove that this limiting condition does
not exist; what with x thousand cases
waiting, there will always be one with
lawyers ready for trial.
The question might be asked whether there are not circumstances under
which such voluntary deferment could
be the cause for justified complaint by
other litigants waiting in line? Again
the answer is no. Those who go to

TABLE 1
Line-Up of Cases for Trial in Regular Order
Waiting Time at
The Point at Which
Case A Reaches
Trial
100

Waiting Time
When Trial
Is Reached

A

100

99B

99 + 1 =100
98 + 2=1 00
97 3 - 100

C

98

97

D

96

96

E

95

G

94

94 +6 = 100
93 + 7 - 100

H

93

92+ 8 = 100
91 + 9 = 100

92
j

91

TOTAL

1,000

Average

.100

TABLE 2
Line-Up and Waiting Time With Some Cases Preferred
93

FH_92± 1
91±+2.

99 + 4 = 103

B

98 + 5 = 103
97 + 6 = 103

96 -+ 7 -- 103
95 + 8 = 103
J 94 +u9 =103
1,000
100

TOTAL
Average

Preferred Cases

TABLE 3
Line-Up and Waiting Time With Some Cases Deferred
FA

A

100
98+1-- 99

D97+

2-

G94+3=
H
J91+6=

97
93-+4= 97
92 +5 = 97
97
96 + 8 = 104

E
E*
Deferred at request of counsel

99

95 +t 7 = 102

F*

what sequence

you eat them."
4. This question of trial gaps is altogether
of crucial importance for the court, and to
avoid them the court should use all its power
and authority. The ground rule that "A request for a continuance on the day of the
trial is presumed not to be bona fide" Is a
good one. Aldisert, A Metropolitan Court

93
93

100 + 3 = 103

A

3. Or, as one of my colleagues neatly summarized it, "If you have to eat a bag of
peanuts, it doesn't matter in

4 = 100

95 + 5 - 100

F

99 + 9= 108

TOTAL
Average

1,000
100

Conquers Its Backlog, 51 JuTJICATUfE 202. 207

(1968).

September, 1968 9 Volume 54

HeinOnline -- 54 A.B.A. J. 887 1968

887

Court Delay Caused by the Bar?
trial in advance of the deferred case,
actually gain one "trial interval". The
waiting time of the cases that come
behind the new, deferred trial date remains unaffected, so they have no complaint either, since they are not worse
off than before.
Although we have established that
the granting of individual deferments
need not affect the delay of the system,
one might still ask whether such requests, even if submitted jointly by
counsel on both sides, ought not be
scrutinized by the court.
It would seem that as long as our
courts have such major unsolved prob.
lems of their own, they should forget
about this problem. Under our system,
litigants as a rule make their ow°n
choice of counsel, although counsel in
turn might refer the case to a specialist
for trial. And if they choose a trial

lawyer who has too many cases waiting, they will know that they must wait
longer for their trial than if they had
chosen a less busy lawyer; and for one
reason or other they will have decided
that it is worth their while. It would
seem that one could leave this choice
to the litigants, especially if they choose
on advice of counsel. As the waiting
time differential between the busy and
the less busy lawyer grows, the system
might even provide its own corrective.
The busy lawyer will increase his trial
staff lest he lose clients to his less busy
colleagues.
One final point: This is not the place
to discuss how the high concentration
of negligence claims in the hands of a
few law firms might affect the interests
of their clients. But since some of the
concentration is in the hands of law
firms that are known in the trade as

"settlers", it is just possible that this
part of the concentration even allevi5
ates the delay.
Altogether then, at least for the time
being, no good case can be made for a
court's concern with the concentration
of cases in the hands of certain members of the Bar unless, of course, it
wants, for reasons of its own, to keep a
red herring handy.6
5. "In a modern metropolitan plaintiff firm,
the lawyers want to build up a certain inventory involving a given insurance carrier. This
inventory has to be well balanced . . . so that
a package deal can be made . .. so that, after
a half day's negotiating, the entire bundle can
be settled . . ... Aldisert, supra note 4, at
207. Judge Aldisert considers this accumulation of cases, eventually to be settled, not only
bad for the plaintiff-litigants (a statement
with which I agree) but also as bad for court
delay (a statement I have difficulty agreeing
with). To be sure, there is the possibility that
pressure to settle at a time when a lawyer
does not want to try a case could help the
delay somewhat. But what if the lawyer's
reasons arc legitimate?
6. See Zeisel, Delay by the Parties and Dela by the Courts, 15 J LEGAL ED, 27-36 (1962).

Course of Study on Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
A

THREE-DAY course of study on
pension and profit-sharing plans will
be presented at the Washington Hilton,
Washington, D. C., on November 1416 by the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American
Law Institute and the American Bar
Association.
The course will cover the basic concepts of the design of a pension and
profit-sharing plan, the major problems
of qualifying a plan with the Internal

Revenue Service, the various methods
of investing the funds and the methods
used to protect the parties. Il addition,
qualified and nonqualified plans will
be explained, the use of qualified plan
benefits in estate planning will be discussed and legislation affecting plans
will be analyzed.
A major problem area-plan amendments, plan terminations and major
corporate changes, such as mergers and
acquisitions-will also receive atten-

tion. Special problems of executive
compensation and how they are solved
through qualified and nouqualified
plans will be discussed.
The planning chairman for the course
of study is David C. Rothman, a pension consultant and author of the
A.L.I.-A.B.A. Joint Committee handbook on Establishing and Administer.
ing Pension and Profit Sharing Plans
and Trust Funds. He will be joined by
practitioners in the field.

Great Plains Federal Tax Institute
THE SIXTH ANNUAL Great Plains Federal Tax Institute will be held on
December 2 and 3 at the Nebraska Center for Continuing Education in Lincoln.
The institute is sponsored j ointly by the Nebraska State Bar Association and the
Nebraska Society of Certified Public Accountants. The featured speaker at the
banquet on Monday evening, December 2, will be Hilary Seal of New Haven,
Connecticut, who will discuss "Current Trends in Deferred Compensation".
Further information may be obtained from Charles E. Wright, Suite 700 First
National Bank Building, Lincoln, Nebraska 68508.
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